Oil & Industrialization

Gulf of Mexico Storm Watch

Posted by methaz on June 25, 2010 - 4:12pm
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: deepwater horizon, gulf of mexico, hurricanes, oil spill [list all tags]

This is the first post by Chuck Watson (aka methaz), Director of Research and Development for Kinetic Analysis Corporation (KAC). KAC provides detailed impact and risk assessments to a wide variety of commercial and government clients, including most of the Caribbean governments, the UK Overseas Territories, and Bloomberg Business News. Over the last few years Chuck has provided exclusive insights in to the potential impact of storms on energy infrastructure here at The Oil Drum, and this year will be joining us as a contributor to help assess the impact storms may have on our energy infrastructure. - Gail

We now have our first serious threat to the Gulf of Mexico this year, in the form of Tropical Depression 1 (TD #1). The current official forecast is for the storm to hit the Yucatan Peninsula and, if it survives, cross the Bay of Campeche and strike the coast again near the Mexico/Texas border. Some of the more advanced computer models are showing that the system may make a more northward turn and become a strong tropical storm or hurricane after passing over Yucatan, potentially impacting the area of the Deepwater Horizon response. I would caution here that forecasting weak systems is tricky, and track/forecast models have a poor track record on storms at this stage.

That said, here is a map of some of the computer models, as of late Friday afternoon (7pm ET), including the official forecast track in bright red. We should have a better handle on where the storm is going, and if there is serious potential to impact the Gulf production areas or DH spill response, over the weekend. As discussed below, if it turns and strengthens, it could be problematic for the DH response.

 

 

If the storm crosses Yucatan directly as per the official Forecast, it should have minimal impact on PEMEX. The waves might cause problems for the DH response, but it is too early to tell. Since we don't really know at this stage if the storm will be a serious threat, below the fold I will discuss in general the impact hurricanes have on production in the Gulf, what a storm might do to the oil spill (and vice versa!), what this year might have in store, and what kinds of info we'll try to post here during incoming storms.

Note: This overview of hurricanes and GOMEX oil/gas production is based on research by Dr. Mark Johnson of the University of Central Florida and myself. This year we will be posting comments on incoming storms, forecasts, and results of our ongoing work here at The Oil Drum as conditions warrant.

Hurricanes and GOMEX Oil/Gas Production

Ever since offshore oil and gas production accelerated in the 1970s, hurricanes have been a factor. However, the rapid expansion of offshore production coincided with a period of lower hurricane activity resulting in part from a 20-30 year climate cycle known as the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). If 2004's Hurricane Ivan was a wake up call, 2005's Katrina and Rita, combined with tight markets, were Mother Nature up-ending the bed and dumping us on the cold hard floor. We are now in a period of higher activity that is likely to last for another 5-10 years.

Hurricanes disrupt Oil/Gas production in two key ways: evacuation and actual damage. Offshore assets must be evacuated well in advance of an incoming storm. Precautionary shut-downs are made to prevent spills in the event platforms, rigs, and undersea pipelines are damaged. Thus, even if a storm completely misses the offshore assets, a storm in the Gulf can cause the loss of 3-5 days of production as crews shut down, evacuate, return, and restore production. Admiral Allen noted in a press conference today they would need to start shutting down the Deepwater Horizon operation 5 days before 34kt winds arrived, and it could take two weeks to resume operations. That seems excessive to me - 3 days evacuation, and 5-7 for recovery seems more in line with historical disruptions, but given the complexity and ad hoc nature of the response equipment may well be true. If 5 days to evacuate number is accurate, this is a serious problem, since 5 day forecasts are notoriously unreliable and have a "cone of uncertainty" of over 300 nautical miles. AL93 is already less they 4 days out, according to some models.

The damage a storm will cause depends on many factors. Waves are a major factor. Older platforms had an air gap (the distance between the normal, static water surface and the base of the platform) of 35 ft to allow waves to pass under the platform. Over time that grew to 55 ft. But Ivan, Katrina, and Rita firmly demonstrated that these air gaps are too small. Chevron's Petronius platform was hit by a 90ft wave in Ivan, and was shut down for six months. Another major problem is damage to the 33,000 mile network of pipelines that connects platforms with on-shore refineries. Undersea landslides, pressure damage, and damage to the infrastructure where the pipelines come onshore can cut off platforms for months. The high winds from a storm can strip off towers, cranes, and other superstructure from offshore assets.

Assets are generally built to withstand a 100 year event. However, that often results in a serious under-design of the entire system. While a 70 foot wave might be a 100 year event at any one point, it is only a 12 year event for at least one platform in the Gulf. Another issue is the harsh offshore environment. In effect these structures are sitting in a salt bath. Even with aggressive preventive maintenance, it is doubtful that a structure designed to handle a 120mph wind can still handle those loads after sitting in the Gulf for years or decades.

Restoration times are also a complex calculation. Some wells, especially older, nearshore assets, are simply not worth restoring as they are too far along in their production cycle to warrant the expense of repairing the damage. For major events like Katrina, another issue is the globally limited resources to replace damaged assets.

2010 Outlook

This doesn't look to be a good year for several reasons. First, we are still clearly in a warm phase AMO cycle, with the Atlantic sea surface temperatures above normal. Second, it is increasingly clear that we will be entering a La Nina phase of the ENSO cycle over the next few weeks. Thus, there will be more energy (SST) and favorable winds (La Nina). Historically, when those conditions exist, there is disruption to Gulf of Mexico (GOMEX) production. Our modeling indicates that 98% of years with climatology similar to this one will lose at least one week of production, as opposed to 40% of all years. On average, 98 million barrels of production are shut in in years like this one.

Oil Spills and Hurricanes

There has been a lot of discussion about the impact of a hurricane on the spill, and vice versa. Jeff Masters has a good discussion on the impact of oil on a storm topic here. As he points out, the size of the storm is large compared to the size of the slick. I agree that as far as the impact of the spill on storms, I seriously doubt it will be noticeable. In theory, an oil sheen should reduce the energy exchange between water and air, and reduce energy available, and therefore weaken a storm. Also in theory, some are arguing the oil will result in slightly higher SSTs, and therefore more energy and stronger storms. I think both arguments are of the "angels on pinheads" variety due to the size factor, and that wave and wind action will disrupt the slicks long before either process could come in to play.

The impact of a storm on the oil is whole different matter. I think the best thing the Gulf Coast could get this year is a direct hit by a big, wet, Cat 1 storm. Strong enough to clean things out, not so bad as to hurt folks much worst than they already are. The currents and wave action would probably mix up and disperse the oil, rain bands and surge would flush out the wetlands without pushing oil much further inland. A worst case might be a mid or southern Gulf bypassing storm - winds, waves could push the oil on to and beyond protective devices as well as deeper in to the marshes, but not be violent enough to seriously mix up the oil and disperse it, and no rain bands to dilute or wash out the wetlands. A direct hit by a stronger storm could potentially push oil far inland, but the mixing and dilution effects should mitigate that somewhat.

Either way, given climatology, we're almost certainly going to find out what a hurricane does to an oil spill this year . 

Macondo ProspectFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Macondo field Country: United States Region: Gulf of Mexico Location: Mississippi Canyon Block(s): 252 Offshore/onshore: offshore Operator: BP Partners: BP (65%)
Anadarko (25%)
MOEX Offshore 2007 (10%) Field history Discovery: 2010 Production Estimated oil in place: 50 million barrels (~6.8×106 t)

The Macondo Prospect (Mississippi Canyon Block 252, abbreviated MC252) is an oil and gas prospect in the Gulf of Mexico, which was the site of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion in April 2010 that led to a major, ongoing oil spill in the region.

Contents [hide]

• 1 Name
• 2 Location
• 3 History
• 4 Deepwater Horizon explosion and blowout
• 5 See also
• 6 References
• 7 External links

[edit]Name

The name Macondo is the same name as the fictitious cursed town in the novel "One Hundred Years of Solitude" by Colombian nobel-prize winning writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez.[1] Oil companies routinely assign code names to offshore prospects early in the exploration effort. This practice helps ensure secrecy during the confidential pre-sale phase, and later provides convenient names for casual reference rather than the often similar-sounding official lease names denoted by, for example, the Minerals Management Service in the case of federal waters in the USA. Names in a given year or area might follow a theme such as beverages (e.g., Cognac), heavenly bodies (e.g., Mars), or even cartoon characters (e.g., Bullwinkle), but usually have no geological or geographical significance to the prospect itself.

[edit]Location

The prospect is located in Mississippi Canyon Block 252 of the Gulf of Mexico. Multinational oil company BP is the operator and principal developer of the oil field with 65% of interest, while 25% is owned by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and 10% by MOEX Offshore 2007, a unit of Mitsui.[2] The prospect may have held 50 million barrels (7.9×106 m3) producible reserves of oil.[3]

[edit]History

A regional shallow hazards survey and study was carried out at the Macondo area by KC Offshore in 1998. High resolution, 2D seismic data along with 3D exploration seismic data of the MC 252 was collected by Fugro Geoservices in 2003. BP purchased the mineral rights to drill for oil in the Macondo Pospect at the Minerals Management Service's lease sale in March 2008.[4]

Mapping of the block was carried out by BP America in 2008 and 2009.[5] BP secured approval to drill the Macondo Prospect from MMS in March 2009 without MMS requiring use of an acoustic blowout preventer actuation alternative. An exploration well was scheduled to be drilled in 2009.[2]

On 7 October 2009 the Transocean Marianas semi-submersible rig commenced drilling, but operations were halted at 4,023 feet (1,226 m) below the sea floor on 29 November 2009, when the rig was damaged by Hurricane Ida.[6] The Transocean's Deepwater Horizon rig resumed drilling operations in February 2010.[2]

[edit]Deepwater Horizon explosion and blowoutMain articles: Deepwater Horizon explosion and Deepwater Horizon oil spill

An explosion on the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon occurred on April 20, 2010. The Deepwater Horizon sank on April 22, 2010, in water approximately 5,000 feet (1,500 m) deep, and has been located resting on the seafloor approximately 1,300 feet (400 m) (about a quarter of a mile) northwest of the well.[7][8][9]

Following the rig explosion and subsea blowout, BP started a relief well using Transocean's Development Driller III on May 2, 2010. The relief well could potentially take up to three months to drill. BP started a second relief well using Transocean's GSF Development Driller II on 16-May-2010.[10]

Starting from May 17, some oil and gas is collected through the riser insertion tube tool inserted to the blowout well. The oil is being stored and gas is being flared on the board of drillship Discoverer Enterprise.[10]

[edit]See also

• List of oil spills
• Deepwater Horizon

[edit]References

1. ^ Gold, Russell (2010-05-27). "Unlikely Decisions Set Stage for BP Disaster". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2010-05-28.
2. ^ a b c "Offshore Field Development Projects: Macondo". Subsea.Org. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
3. ^ Klump, Edward (2010-05-13). "Spill May Hit Anadarko Hardest as BP's Silent Partner". Bloomberg. Retrieved 2010-05-19.
4. ^ "Central Gulf of Mexico Planning Area Lease Sale 206 Information". US Minerals Management Service. 2008-08-08. Retrieved 2010-06-06.
5. ^ "Macondo Prospect, Gulf of Mexico, USA". offshore-technology.com. Net Resources International. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
6. ^ "Documents show BP chose a less-expensive, less-reliable method for completing well in Gulf oil spill". Orlando Sentinel. Retrieved 2010-05-23.
7. ^ Robertson, Cambell; Robbins, Liz (2010-04-22). "Oil Rig Sinks in the Gulf of Mexico". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-04-22.
8. ^ Resnick-Ault, Jessica; Klimasinska, Katarzyna (April 22, 2010). "Transocean Oil-Drilling Rig Sinks in Gulf of Mexico". Bloomberg. Retrieved April 22, 2010.
9. ^ "Deepwater Horizon Incident, Gulf of Mexico". National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of Response and Restoration. 2010-04-24. Retrieved 2010-04-25.
10. ^ a b BP (2010-05-24). "Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response - 24 May". Press release. Retrieved 2010-05-24.

[edit]External links

• Griffitt, Michelle. "Initial Exploration Plan Mississippi Canyon Block 252 OCS-G 32306" (PDF). BP Exploration and Production (New Orleans, Louisiana: Minerals Management Service).

[hide] v • d • e Deepwater Horizon oil spill Owners Anadarko Petroleum Corporation · BP plc · Mitsui Oil Exploration Co. Exploration Macondo Prospect · Mississippi Canyon · Deepwater Horizon · Deepwater Horizon explosion Timeline Timeline of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill Relief ships/rigs Development Driller III · Discoverer Clear Leader · Discoverer Enterprise · GSF Development Driller II · Helix Producer 1 · Loch Rannoch · Mighty Servant 3 · Overseas Cascade · Q4000 ·Toisa Pisces Major contractors

Cameron International Corporation · Halliburton · Nalco Holding Company · Transocean · Wild Well Control

Impact

Wildlife Refuges at risk · Endangered species at risk

Long term impact

Litigation · Economic & Political

USCG people

Thad Allen · Mary Landry · James A. Watson

MMS people

S. Elizabeth Birnbaum · Michael R. Bromwich · Chris Oynes

Adhoc entities Flow Rate Technical Group · Unified Command · National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Categories: Oil fields of the United States | Gulf of Mexico | BP | Deepwater Horizon oil spill

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The Big Picture: Why Is It So Hard to Stop the Oil Gusher, and Why Was Such Extreme Deepwater Drilling Allowed in the First Place?

 

The government failed to properly ensure that BP used adequate safety measures, BP and their contractors were criminally negligent for the oil spill, and BP has tried to cover up the problem. See this.

But why hasn't BP stopped the leak?

Some people assume that BP hasn't stopped the oil leak because it's people are wholly incompetent.

Others have asked whether BP's $75 million liability cap is motivating it to stall by taking half-hearted measures until it's relief well drilling is complete.

But there is another possible explanation: the geology - as well the deepwater pressures - at the drilling site makes stopping the leak more difficult than we realize.

Does the Geology of the Spill Zone Make It Harder to Stop the Oil Spill?

We can't understand the big picture behind the Gulf oil spill unless we know the underwater geology of the seabed and the underlying rocks.

For example, if there is solid rock beneath the leaking pipes, with channels leading to various underground chambers, then it might be possible to seal the leaking risers and blowout preventer, with the oil flowing somewhere harmless under the floor of the ocean.

On the other hand, if there are hundreds of feet of sand or mud beneath the leaking pipes, then sealing the spill zone might not work, as the high-pressure oil flow (more than 2,000 pounds per square inch) might just shoot out into the water somewhere else.

We don't know the geology under the spill site. BP has never publicly released geological cross-sections of the seabed and underlying rock. BP's Initial Exploration Plan refers to "structure contour maps" and "geological cross sections", but all detailed geological information, maps and drawings have been designated "proprietary information" by BP, and have been kept under wraps.

However, Roger Anderson and Albert Boulanger of Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory describe the basic geology of the oil-rich region of the Gulf:

 

Production in the deepwater province is centered in turbidite sands recently deposited from the Mississippi delta. Even more prolific rates have been recorded in the carbonates of Mexico, with the Golden Lane and Campeche reporting 100,000 barrel per day production from single wells. However, most of the deep and ultra-deepwater Gulf of Mexico is covered by the Sigsbee salt sheet that forms a large, near-surface “moonscape” culminating at the edge of the continental slope in an 800 meter high escarpment.

***

Salt is the dominant structural element of the ultra-deepwater Gulf of Mexico petroleum system. Large horizontal salt sheets, driven by the huge Plio-Pleistocene to Oligocene sediment dump of the Mississippi, Rio Grande and other Gulf Coast Rivers, dominate the slope to the Sigsbee escarpment. Salt movement is recorded by large, stepped, counter-regional growth faults and down-to-the-basin fault systems soling into evacuated salt surfaces. Horizontal velocities of salt movement to the south are in the several cm/year range, making this supposedly passive margin as tectonically active as most plate boundaries.

***

Porosities over 30 percent and permeabilities greater than one darcy in deepwater turbidite reservoirs have been commonly cited. Compaction and diagenesis of deepwater reservoir sands are minimal because of relatively recent and rapid sedimentation. Sands at almost 20,000 feet in the auger field (Garden Banks 426) still retain a porosity of 26% and a permeability of almost 350mdarcies. Pliocene and Pleistocene turbidite sands in the Green Canyon 205 field have reported porosities ranging from 28 to 32% with permeabilities between 400 mdarcies and 3 darcies. Connectivity in sheet sands and amalgamated sheet and channel sands is high for deepwater turbidite reservoirs and recovery efficiencies are in the 40-60% range.

 

See also this.

The BP oil spill leak is occurring in Block 252 of the "Macondo" Prospect in the Mississippi Canyon Area of the Gulf. The Mississippi Canyon Area is very typical of the Gulf oil region.

If the geology at Block 252 is like that described by Anderson and Boulanger for the Gulf oil region as a whole, then it might be difficult to stop the oil gusher without completing relief wells (which will take a couple of months). Again, if there are salt layers right under the sea floor, high porosity near the surface or salt movement, then sealing the leak by plugging the risers and blowout preventer might not work. The oil pressure is coming up at such high pressures that sealing the leaking equipment at the level of the seabed might just mean the oil will flow out somewhere else nearby.

The government must publicly release details of the geology under the spill site. The American people - and people in Mexico, Cuba and other countries which might be affected by the spill - have a right to know what we're dealing with.

Until it does so, people will not have be understand what is going on. And failing to release such information may prevent creative scientists from around the world from coming up with a workable solution.

Moreover, as the first draft of Anderson and Boulanger's paper - released in 2001 - noted:

 

No means currently exists to produce oil and gas to market from such water depths!

 

(exclamation point is Anderson and Boulanger's). In other words, the technology to drill in such deepwater conditions in the Gulf has only been developed after 2001.

While BP, its subcontractors, and the government were all negligent with regard to the Deepwater Horizon operation, it must be remembered that drilling at such depths is new technology, operating in largely uncharted conditions. As such, the dangers of deepwater drilling in general should not be underestimated. The geology of the oil-rich region in the Gulf - as well as the deep, high-pressure conditions - makes drilling difficult, and containing oil spills challenging.

Oil Is Considered A National Security Issue

So why are oil companies being allowed to drill so deeply under the Gulf in the first place? In other words, why has the government been so supportive of deepwater drilling in the Gulf?

The answer - as Anderson and Boulanger note - is that there is a tremendous amount of more oil deep under the Gulf, and that the United States government considers oil drilling in the deep waters of the Gulf as a national security priority:

The oil and gas industry and the United States government both face tremendous challenges to explore discover, appraise, develop, and exploit vast new hydrocarbon reserves in waters deeper than 6000 feet in the ultra-deepwater of the Gulf of Mexico. Yet these new reserves of hydrocarbons are needed to offset the economically detrimental, long-term decline in production from within the borders of the United States

***

If successfully developed, the new play concept would fill an essential gap in the overall strategic defenses of the United States by decreasing the gap that results in the nation's dependence on foreign oil and gas reserves in this volatile and hostile, post 9/11 world. However, the successful production of oil and gas from this new carbonate play concept requires much more cost-efficient evaluation and appraisal technologies than exist today to economically conduct exploration, appraisal, and development activities. These new technologies must be developed before production can be practical in the ultra-deepwater operating environment.... The Ultra-Deepwater and Unconventional Gas Trust Fund of the DOE has as its mission to cut costs and time-to-market not incrementally, but radically, so that the United States can optimally utilize these strategic hydrocarbon reserves. The DOE, with extensive industry,academic and non-governmental assistance, developed an Offshore Technology Roadmap ...,

***

The U. S. Energy Bill of 2002 has allocated significant resources to fund innovative industry, academic, and national laboratory research initiatives to develop the new technologies necessary to explore and produce these new ultra-deepwater reserves economically. The purpose is not only to impact the national defense, but also to regain our international technological leadership in the deepwater, recently lost to the Brazilians, Norwegians, and Europeans.

***

Congress, never a big friend to energy interests, has acted to create the Ultra-deepwater Trust Fund that would add an astounding $200 billion by 2017, if successful at developing the new production technologies required.

So the Department of Energy and Congress have committed to development of the deepwater Gulf oil reserves in the name of national security. This also helps explain why Obama has been pro-drilling in the Gulf.

But let's take a step back and ask why the government considers oil a national security priority in the first place.

Well, as professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College Mackubin T. Owenswrites:

 

The concern of these lawmakers [regarding the BP oil spill] is understandable, but lest they overreact, they need to place their valid concerns within the broader context of the nation’s economic health and energy security.

***

Americans currently consume about 22 million barrels of oil daily, of which about two-thirds is imported. The Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects imports to reach 70% by 2025. This means we send billions of dollars abroad in payment for foreign oil. This makes little sense when, according to the U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS), there are vast reserves of oil and gas beneath Federal lands and coastal waters. And it is likely that even these estimates are low. For instance, in 1987, MMS estimated that there were 9 billion barrels of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. By 2007, once drilling had begun in deeper waters, MMS had revised its estimate upward to 45 billion.

In addition, the U.S. military is the largest consumer of oil in the world. And the government is eager to ensure that the military maintains access to oil.

As NPR reported in 2007:

 

All the U.S. tanks, planes and ships guzzle 340,000 barrels of oil a day, making the American military the single-largest purchaser and consumer of oil in the world.

If the Defense Department were a country, it would rank about 38th in the world for oil consumption, right behind the Philippines.

As Reuters pointed out in 2008:

U.S. military fuel consumption dwarfs energy demand in many countries around the world, adding up to nearly double the fuel use in Ireland and 20 times more than that of Iceland, according to the U.S. Department of Energy.

And as I summarized last year:

Sara Flounders writes:

By every measure, the Pentagon is the largest institutional user of petroleum products and energy in general. Yet the Pentagon has a blanket exemption in all international climate agreements.

***

The Feb. 17, 2007, Energy Bulletin detailed the oil consumption just for the Pentagon's aircraft, ships, ground vehicles and facilities that made it the single-largest oil consumer in the world.

***

Even according to rankings in the 2006 CIA World Factbook, only 35 countries (out of 210 in the world) consume more oil per day than the Pentagon.

***

As I pointed out out last week:

Professor Michael Klare noted in 2007:

Sixteen gallons of oil. That's how much the average American soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan consumes on a daily basis -- either directly, through the use of Humvees, tanks, trucks, and helicopters, or indirectly, by calling in air strikes. Multiply this figure by 162,000 soldiers in Iraq, 24,000 in Afghanistan, and 30,000 in the surrounding region (including sailors aboard U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf) and you arrive at approximately3.5 million gallons of oil: the daily petroleum tab for U.S. combat operations in the Middle East war zone.
And in 2008, Oil Change International released a report showing that [b]etween March 2003 and October 2007 the US military in Iraq purchased more than 4 billion gallons of fuel from the Defense Energy Support Center, the agency responsible for procuring and supplying petroleum products to the Department of Defense.
Indeed, Alan Greenspan, John McCain, George W. Bush, Sarah Palin, a high-level National Security Council officer and others all say that the Iraq war was really about oil.

Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz says that the Iraq war alone will cost $3-5 trillion dollars.

And economist Anita Dancs writes:

Each year, our military devotes substantial resources to securing access to and safeguarding the transportation of oil and other energy sources. I estimate that we will pay $90 billion this year to secure oil. If spending on the Iraq War is included, the total rises to $166 billion.

Are you starting to get the picture?

In addition, experts say that the Iraq war has increased the threat of terrorism. See this,this, this, this, this, this and this.

Personally, I strongly believe that it is vital for our national security - and our economy - to switch from dependence on oil to a basket of alternative energies. As I pointed out Friday:

It's not just the one BP oil rig. For example, since the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig exploded on April 20th, the Obama administration has granted oil and gas companies at least 27 exemptions from doing in-depth environmental studies of oil exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico. Then there are the 12 new oil and gas drilling rigs launched in the U.S. this week.

And a whistleblower who survived the Gulf oil explosion claims in a lawsuit that BP's operations at another oil platform risk another catastrophic accident that could "dwarf" the Gulf oil spill, partly because BP never even reviewed critical engineering designs for the operation. And see this.

***

And the Department of Defense also apparently has some issues with extensive off-shore drilling for security reasons.

Many still believe that alternative energy is an expensive, unrealistic pipe dream.

But that is no longer necessarily true, especially when the externalities of environmental and military costs are taken into account.

But existing national policy is to do whatever is necessary - drilling deep under the Gulf and launching our military abroad - to secure oil. Until we change our national security and energy policies, future mishaps - environmental, military and economic - may frequently occur.

Energy Transitions Past and Future: BP's Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill in Context (by Cutler Cleveland)

Posted by Nate Hagens on June 7, 2010 - 9:25am
Topic: Alternative energy
Tags: cutler cleveland, energy transitions, eroei, eroi, net energy, original [list all tags]

Below the fold is rerun of an essay from Cutler Cleveland on energy transitions. The unfolding drama in the Gulf of Mexico serves as a reminder of how dependent our modern civilization has become on fossil fuels. Dr. Cleveland's essay provides an excellent big picture overview, especially for readers here new to the topic, of what supply side variables we need to consider as we transition away from our extreme fossil fuel subsidy. Replacing stock based (fossil) energy with flow based (renewable) is not as simple as one for one BTU substitution. Professor Cleveland previously wrote "Energy From Wind - A Discussion of the EROI Research", and "Ten Fundamental Principles of Net Energy" posted on theoildrum.com. Cutler Cleveland is a Professor at Boston University and has been researching and writing on energy issues for over 25 years.

Image: Prometheus chained to Mount Caucasus. Source: Pieter Paul Rubens: ''Prometheus Bound,'' 1611-1612, Oil on canvas, 95 7/8" x 82 1/2". (Philadelphia Museum of Art: The W.P. Wilstach Collection)

INTRODUCTION

In Greek mythology, Prometheus defied the will of Zeus by stealing fire and giving it to the mortal race of men in their dark caves. Zeus was enraged by Prometheus' deceit, so he had Prometheus carried to Mount Caucasus, where an eagle would pick at his liver; it would grow back each day and the eagle would eat it again. Fire transformed mortal life by providing light, warmth, cooking, healing and ultimately the ability to smelt and forge metals, and to bake bricks, ceramics, and lime. Fire became the basis for the Greek culture and ultimately all Western culture. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Greeks attributed fire not to a mortal origin, but to a Titan, one of the godlike giants who were considered to be the personifications of the forces of nature.

If fire was the first Promethean energy technology, then Promethean II was the heat engine, powered first by wood and coal, and then by oil and natural gas. Like fire, heat engines achieve a qualitative conversion of energy (heat into mechanical work), and they sustain a chain reaction process by supplying surplus energy. Surplus energy or (net energy) is the gross energy extracted less the energy used in the extraction process itself. The Promethean nature of fossil fuels is due to the much larger surplus they deliver compared to animate energy converters such as draft animals and human labor.

The changes wrought by fossil fuels exceeded even those produced by the introduction of fire. The rapid expansion of the human population and its material living standard over the past 200 years could not have been produced by direct solar energy and wood being converted by plants, humans and draft animals. Advances in every human sphere — commerce, agriculture, transportation, the military, science and technology, household life, health care, public utilities—were driven directly or indirectly by the changes in society's underlying energy systems.

In the coming decades, world oil production will peak and then begin to decline, followed by natural gas and eventually coal production. There is considerable debate about when these peaks will occur because such information would greatly aid energy companies, policy makers, and the general public. But at another level, the timing of peak fossil fuel production doesn't really matter. A more fundamental issue is the magnitude and nature of the energy transition that will eventually occur. The next energy transition undoubtedly will have far reaching impacts just as fire and fossil fuels did. However, the next energy transition will occur under a very different set of conditions, which are the subject of the rest of this discussion.

The Magnitude of the Shift

 

Figure 2. Composition of U.S. energy use. (Source: Cutler Cleveland) Click to Enlarge

 

The last major transition occurred in the late 19th century when coal replaced wood as the dominant fuel. Figure 2 illustrates this transition for the United States, a period often referred to as the second Industrial Revolution (the first being the widespread replacement of manual labor by machines that began in Britain in the 18th century, and the resultant shift from a largely rural and agrarian population to a town-centered society engaged increasingly in factory manufacture). Wood and animal feed suppled more than 95% of the energy used in the United States in 1800. The population of the nation stood at just 5.3 million people, per capita GDP was about $1,200 (in real US$2000), dominant energy converters were human labor and draft animals (horses), and the population was overwhelmingly rural and concentrated near the eastern seaboard.

 

Figure 3. The global flux of fossil and renewable fuels. (Source: Smil, V. 2006. "21st century energy: Some sobering thoughts.'' OECD Observer 258/59: 22-23.) Click to Enlarge

 

The nation was completely transformed by World War I. Coal had replaced wood as the dominant fuel, meeting 70% of the nation's energy needs, with hydropower and newcomers oil and natural gas combining for an additional 15%. Steam engines and turbines had replaced people and draft animals as the dominant energy converters. The population had soared to more than 100 million, per capita GDP had increased by a factor of five to $6,000, more than half of the nation's population lived in cities, and manufacturing and services accounted for most of the nation's economic output. Thus, the transition from wood to fossil fuels, and its associated shift in the energy-using capital stock, produced as fundamental a transition in human existence as did the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture.

How much renewable energy is needed if it were to replace fossil fuels in the same pattern as coal replaced wood? The United States first consumed as much coal as wood in about 1885. Total energy use then was about 5.6 quadrillion BTU (1 quadrillion = 1015), equal to about 0.19 TW (Terawatts or 1012 watts). Consider what it would take today to replace even just one-half of U.S. fossil fuel use with renewable energy: we would need to displace coal and petroleum energy flows of 2.9 TW, or 32 times the amount of coal used in 1885. Current global fossil fuel use is about 13 TW, so we need more than 6 TW of renewable energies to replace 50% of all fossil fuels. This is a staggering shift.

Is renewable energy up to this challenge? There are physical, economic, technical, environmental, and social components to this question. Figure 3 depicts one slice of the picture: pure physical availability as measured by the global annual flow of various energies. The only renewable energy that exceeds annual global fossil fuel use is direct solar radiation, which is several orders of magnitudes larger than fossil fuel use. To date however, the delivery of electricity (photovoltaics) or heat (solar thermal) directly from solar energy represents a tiny fraction of our energy portfolio due to economic and technical constraints. Most other renewable energy flows could not meet current energy needs even if they were fully utilized. More importantly, there are important qualitative aspects to solar, wind, and biomass energy that pose unique challenges to their widespread utilization.

ENERGY QUALITY

Most discussions of energy require the aggregation of different forms and types of energy. The notion of "total energy use" in Figures 2 and 3 indicates that various physical amounts of energy—coal, oil, gas, uranium, kilowatt-hours (kWh), radiation—are added together. The simplest and most common form form of aggregation is to add up the individual variables according to their thermal equivalents (BTUs, joules, etc.). For example, 1 kWh is equal to 3.6x106 joules, 1 barrel of oil is equal to 6.1x109 joules, and so on.

Despite its widespread use, aggregation by heat content ignores the fact that not all joules are equal. For example, a joule of electricity can perform tasks such as illumination and spinning a CD-ROM that other forms of energy cannot do, or could do in a much more cumbersome and expensive fashion (Imagine trying to power your laptop directly with coal).

These differences among types of energy are described by the concept of energy quality, which is the difference in the ability of a unit of energy to produce goods and services for people. Energy quality is determined by a complex combination of physical, chemical, technical, economic, environmental and social attributes that are unique to each form of energy. These attributes include gravimetric and volumetric energy density, power density, emissions, cost and efficiency of conversion, financial risk, amenability to storage, risk to human health, spatial distribution, intermittency, and ease of transport.

Energy Density

 

Figure 4. Energy densities for various fuels and forms of energy. (Source: Cutler Cleveland) Click to Enlarge

 

Energy density refers to the quantity of energy contained in a form of energy per unit mass or volume. The units of energy density are megajoules per kilogram (MJ/kg) or megajoules per liter (MJ/l). Figure 4 illustrates a fundamental driver behind earlier energy transitions: the substitution of coal for biomass and then petroleum for coal were shifts to more concentrated forms of energy. Solid and liquid fossil fuels have much larger mass densities than biomass fuels, and an even greater advantage in terms of volumetric densities. The preeminent position of liquid fuels derived from crude oil in terms of its combined densities is one reason why it transformed the availability, nature and impact of personal and commercial transport in society. The lower energy density of biomass (12-15 MJ/kg) compared to crude oil (42 MJ/kg) means that replacing the latter with the former will require a significantly larger infrastructure (labor, capital, materials, energy) to produce an equivalent quantity of energy.

The concept of energy density underlies many of the challenges facing the large scale utilization of hydrogen as a fuel. Hydrogen has the highest energy to weight ratio of all fuels. One kg of hydrogen contains the same amount of energy as 2.1 kg of natural gas or 2.8 kg of gasoline. The high gravimetric density of hydrogen is one reason why it is used for a fuel in the space program to power the engines that lift objects against gravity. However, hydrogen has an extremely low amount of energy per unit volume (methane has nearly 4 times more energy per liter than hydrogen). Hydrogen's low volumetric energy density poses significant technical and economic challenges to the large-scale production, transport and storage for commercial amounts of the fuel.

Power Density

 

Figure 5. Power densities for fossil and renewable fuels. (Source: Smil, V. 2006. ''21st century energy: Some sobering thoughts.'' OECD Observer 258/59: 22-23.) Click to Enlarge

 

Power density is the rate of energy production per unit of the earth’s area, and is usually expressed in watts per square meter (W/m2). The environmental scientist Vaclav Smil has documented the important differences between fossil and renewable energies, and their implications for the next energy transition. Due to the enormous amount of geologic energy invested in their formation, fossil fuel deposits are an extraordinarily concentrated source of high-quality energy, commonly extracted with power densities of 10^2 or 10^3 W/m2 of coal or hydrocarbon fields. This means that very small land areas are needed to supply enormous energy flows. In contrast, biomass energy production has densities well below 1 W/m2, while densities of electricity produced by water and wind are commonly below 10 W/m2. Only photovoltaic generation, a technique not yet ready for mass utilization, can deliver more than 20 W/m2 of peak power.

The high power densities of energy systems has enabled the increasing concentration of human activity. About 50% of the world's population occupies less than 3% of the inhabited land area; economic activity is similarly concentrated. Buildings, factories and cities currently use energy at power densities of one to three orders of magnitude lower than the power densities of the fuels and thermal electricity that support them. Smil observes that in order to energize the existing residential, industrial and transportation infrastructures inherited from the fossil-fueled era, a solar-based society would have to concentrate diffuse flows to bridge these large power density gaps.

Mismatch between the inherently low power densities of renewable energy flows and relatively high power densities of modern final energy uses means that a solar-based system will require a profound spatial restructuring with major environmental and socioeconomic consequences. Most notably according to Smil, there would be vastly increased fixed land requirements for primary conversions, especially with all conversions relying on inherently inefficient photosynthesis whose power densities of are minuscule: the mean is about 450 mW/m2 of ice-free land, and even the most productive fuel crops or tree plantations have gross yields of less than 1 W/m2 and subsequent conversions to electricity and liquid fuels prorate to less than 0.5 W/m2.

Energy Surplus

 

Figure 6. The energy return on investment (EROI) for various fuel sources in the U.S. (Source: Cutler Cleveland) Click to Enlarge

 

Energy return on investment (EROI) is the ratio of the energy extracted or delivered by a process to the energy used directly and indirectly in that process. A common related term is energy surplus, which is the gross amount of energy extracted or delivered, minus the energy used directly and indirectly in that process. The unprecedented expansion of the human population, the global economy, and per capita living standards of the last 200 years was powered by high EROI, high energy surplus fossil fuels. The penultimate position of fossil fuels in the energy hierarchy stems from the fact that they have a high EROI and a very large energy surplus. The largest oil and gas fields, which are found early in the exploration process due to their sheer physical size, delivered energy surpluses that dwarfed any previous source (and any source developed since then). That surplus, in combination with other attributes, is what makes conventional fossil fuels unique. The long-run challenge society faces is to replace the current system with a combination of alternatives with similar attributes and a much lower carbon intensity.

Most alternatives to conventional liquid fuels have very low or unknown EROIs (Figure 6). The EROI for ethanol derived from corn grown in the U.S. is about 1.5:1, well below that for conventional motor gasoline. Ethanol from sugarcane grown in Brazil apparently has a higher EROI, perhaps as high as 8:1, due to higher yields of sugarcane compared to corn, the use of bagasse as an energy input, and significant cost reductions in ethanol production technology. Shale oil and coal liquefaction have low EROIs and high carbon intensities, although little work has been done in this area in more than 20 years. The Alberta oil sands remain an enigma from a net energy perspective. Anecdotal evidence suggests an EROI of 3:1, but these reports lack veracity. Certainly oil sands will have a lower EROI than conventional crude oil due to the more diffuse nature of the resource base and associated increase in direct and indirect processing energy costs.

Intermittency

 

Figure 7. A typical 24 hour load profile for a residence in San Jose, CA. (Source: NREL) Click to Enlarge

 

Intermittency refers to the fraction of time that an energy source is available to society. It is an essential feature of electricity generation systems that must combine power generated from multiple sources and locations to supply electricity "24/7." The wind does not blow all the time and the sun does not shine all the time, so a wind turbine and PV array sometimes stand idle. One aspect of intermittency is the load factor or capacity factor, which is the ratio of the output of a power plant compared to the maximum output it could produce. Due to the more or less continuous nature of fossil fuel extraction, thermal power plants have capacity factors of 75 to 90 percent. Typical annual average load factors for wind power are in the range of 20 to 35 percent, depending primarily on wind climate, but also wind turbine design.

 

Figure 8. The variability of wind energy over a 1y day period. The figure compares the hourly output of 500 MW wind power capacity in two situations, calculated from observed data in Denmark. The red line shows the output of a single site; the blue line shows the multiple site output. Source: European Wind Energy Association, ''Large scale integration of wind energy in the European power supply: analysis, issues and recommendations'' (December 2005) Click to Enlarge

 

Load profiles show characteristic daily and seasonal patterns (Figure 7). For example, most hourly profiles for commercial and institutional facilities rise in the middle of the day and then taper off during early morning and late evening hours. Wind and solar energy availability frequently do not match typical load profiles (Figure 8).

Such intermittency means that wind and solar power are really not “dispatchable”—you can’t necessarily start them up when you most need them. Thus, when wind or solar power is first added to a region’s grid, they do not replace an equivalent amount of existing generating capacity—i.e. the thermal generators that already existed will not immediately be shut down. This is measured by capacity credit, which is the reduction of installed power capacity at thermal power stations enabled by the addition of wind or solar power in such a way that the probability of loss of load a peak times is not increased.

So, for example, 1000 MW of installed wind power with a capacity credit of 30% can avoid a 300 MW investment in conventional dispatchable power. A recent survey of U.S. utilities reveals capacity credits given to wind power in the range of 3 to 40 percent of rated wind capacity, with many falling in the 20 to 30 percent range. A large geographical spread of wind or solar power is needed to reduce variability, increase predictability and decrease the occurrences of near zero or peak output.

These and other "ancillary costs" associated with wind and solar power are small at low levels of utilization, but rise as those sources further penetrate the market. In the longer run, the impacts of these additional costs on the the deployment of wind and solar power must be compared with the effective costs of other low-carbon power sources such as nuclear power, or the costs of fossil thermal generation under strong carbon constraints (i.e., carbon capture and storage).

Spatial distribution

 

Figure 9. The distribution of wind speeds at 80 meters, the hub height of a modern turbine. (Source: Cristina L. Archer and Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of global wind power) Click to Enlarge

 

All natural resources show distinct geographical gradients. In the case of oil and natural gas for example, the ten largest geologic provinces contain more than 60 percent of known volumes, and half of those are in the Persian Gulf. Coal and uranium deposits also are distributed in distinct, concentrated distributions. The pattern of occurrence imposes transportation and transaction costs, and in the case of oil and strategic minerals, also imposes risk associated with economic and national security.

 

Figure 10. The distribution of solar energy exhibits a strong geographical gradient. (Source: NREL) Click to Enlarge

 

Of course, renewable energy flows exhibit their own characteristic distributions (Figures 9 and 10), producing mismatches between areas of high-quality supply and demand centers. Many large urban areas are far from a high-quality source of geothermal energy, do not have high wind power potential, or have low annual rates of solar insolation. Indeed, many of the windiest and sunny regions in the world are virtually uninhabited. The spatial distribution of renewable energy flows means that significant new infrastructures will be needed to collect, concentrate and deliver useful amounts of power and energy to demand centers.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRONTIER IS CLOSED

The transition from wood to coal occurred when the human population was small, its affluence was modest, and its technologies were much less powerful than today. As a result, environmental impacts associated with energy had negligible global impact, although local impacts were at times quite significant. Any future energy transition will operate under a new set of environmental constraints. Environmental change has significantly impaired the health of people, economics and ecosystems at local, regional and global scales. Future energy systems must be designed and deployed with environmental constraints that were absent from the minds of the inventors of the steam engine and internal combustion engines.

Air Pollution and Climate Change

 

Figure 11. The Mauna Loa curve showing the rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations (Source: Keeling, C.D. and T.P. Whorf. 2005. Atmospheric CO2 records from sites in the SIO air sampling network. In Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A.) Click to Enlarge

 

Atmospheric releases from fossil fuel energy systems comprise 64 percent of global anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions from 1850-1990 (Figure 11), 89 percent of global anthropogenic sulfur emissions from 1850 to 1990, and 17 percent of global anthropogenic methane emissions from 1860-1994. Fossil energy combustion also releases significant quantities of nitrogen oxide; in the United States, 23 percent of such emissions are from energy use. Power generation using fossil fuels, especially coal, is a principal source of trace heavy metals such as mercury, selenium, and arsenic.

These emissions drive a range of global and regional environmental changes, including global climate change, acid deposition, and urban smog, and they pose a major health risk. According to the Health Effects Institute, the global annual burden of outdoor air pollution amounts to about 0.8 million premature deaths and 6.4 million years of life lost. This burden occurs predominantly in developing countries; 65% in Asia alone. According to the World Health Organization, in the year 2000, indoor air pollution from solid fuel use was responsible for more than 1.6 million annual deaths and 2.7% of the global burden of disease. This makes this risk factor the second biggest environmental contributor to ill health, behind unsafe water and sanitation.

Climate change may be the most far-reaching impact associated with fossil fuel use. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 parts per million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005 (Figure 6). The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeds by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years (180 to 300 ppm) as determined from ice cores. The primary source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since the pre-industrial period results from fossil fuel use, with land use change providing another significant but smaller contribution. The increase in carbon dioxide concentrations are a principal driving force behind the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century.

Carbon intensity is an increasingly important attribute of fuel and power systems. Social and political forces to address climate change may produce another distinguishing feature of the next energy transition: environmental considerations may be a key important driver, rather then the inherent advantages of energy systems as measured by energy density, power density, net energy, and so on.

Appropriation of the products of the biosphere

 

Figure 12. Human appropriation of net primary production (NPP) as a percentage of the local NPP. (Source: Imhoff, Marc L., Lahouari Bounoua, Taylor Ricketts, Colby Loucks, Robert Harriss, and William T. Lawrence. 2004. Global patterns in human consumption of net primary production. ''Nature'', 429, 24 June 2004: 870-873. Image retrieved from NASA) Click to Enlarge

 

The low energy and power density of most renewable alternatives collides with a second global environmental imperative: human use of the Earth's plant life for food, fiber, wood and fuelwood. Satellite measurements have been used to calculate the annual net primary production (NPP)—the net amount of solar energy converted to plant organic matter through photosynthesis—on land, and then combined with models to estimate the annual percentage of NPP humans consume (Figure 12).

Humans in sparsely populated areas, like the Amazon, consume a very small percentage of locally generated NPP. Large urban areas consume 300 times more than the local area produced. North Americans use almost 24 percent of the region's NPP. On a global scale, humans annually require 20 percent of global NPP.

Human appropriation of NPP, apart from leaving less for other species to use, alters the composition of the atmosphere, levels of biodiversity, energy flows within food webs, and the provision of important ecosystem services. There is strong evidence from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and other research that our use of NPP has seriously compromised many of the planet's basic ecosystem services. Replacing energy-dense liquid fuels from crude oil with less energy dense biomass fuels will require 1,000- to 10,000-fold increase in land area relative to the existing energy infrastructure, and thus place additional significant pressure on the planet's life support systems.

The rise of energy markets

When coal replaced wood, most energy markets were local or regional in scale, and many were informal. Energy prices were based on local economic and political forces. Most energy today is traded in formal markets, and prices often are influenced by global events. Crude oil prices drive the trends in price for most other forms of energy, and they are formed by a complex, dynamic, and often unpredictable array of economic, geologic, technological, weather, political, and strategic forces.

The rise of commodity and futures markets for energy not only added volatility to energy markets, and hence energy prices, but also helped elevate energy as to a key strategic financial commodity. The sheer volume of energy bought and sold today combined with high energy prices has transformed energy corporations into powerful multinational forces. In 2006, five of the world's largest corporations were energy suppliers (Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips). The privatization of state-owned energy industries is also a development of historic dimensions that is transforming the global markets for oil, gas, coal and electric power.

Global market forces will thus be an important driving force behind the next energy transition. There is considerable debate about the extent to which markets can and should be relied upon to guide the choice of our future energy mix. Externalities and subsidies are pervasive across all energy systems in every nation. The external cost of greenhouse gas emissions from energy use looms as a critical aspect of energy markets and environmental policy. The distortion of market signals by subsidies and externalities suggests that government policy intervention is needed to produce the socially desirable mix of energy. The effort to regulate greenhouse gas emissions at the international level is the penultimate example of government intervention in energy markets. The political and social debate about the nature and degree of government energy policy will intensify when global crude oil supply visibly declines and as pressure mounts to act on climate change.

Energy and poverty

 

Figure 14. Energy and basic human needs. The international relationship between energy use (kilograms of oil equivalent per capita) and the Human Development Index (2000). (Source: UNDP, 2002, WRI, 2002) Click to Enlarge

 

The energy transition that powered the Industrial Revolution helped create a new economic and social class by raising the incomes and changing the occupations of a large fraction of society who were then employed in rural, agrarian economies. The next energy transition will occur under fundamentally different socioeconomic conditions. Future energy systems must supply adequate energy to support the high and still growing living standards in wealthy nations, and they must supply energy sufficient to relieve the abject poverty of the world's poorest.

The scale of the world's underclass is unprecedented in human history. According to the World Bank, about 1.2 billion people still live on less than $1 per day, and almost 3 billion on less than $2 per day. Nearly 110 million primary school age children are out of school, 60 percent of them girls. 31 million people are infected with HIV/AIDS. And many more live without adequate food, shelter, safe water, and sanitation.

Energy use and economic development go hand-in-hand (Figure 14), so poverty has an important energy dimension: the lack of access to high quality forms of energy. Energy poverty has been defined as the absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, high quality, safe and environmentally benign energy services to support economic and human development. Nearly 1.6 billion people have no access to electricity and some 2.4 billion people rely on traditional biomass—wood, agricultural residues and dung—for cooking and heating. The combustion of those traditional fuels has profound human health impacts, especially for woman and children. Access to liquid and gaseous fuels and electricity is a necessary condition for poverty reduction and improvements in human health.

CONCLUSIONS

The debate about "peak oil" aside, there are relatively abundant remaining supplies of fossil fuels. Their quality is declining, but not yet to the extent that increasing scarcity will help trigger a major energy transition like wood scarcity did in the 19th century. The costs of wind, solar and biomass have declined due to steady technical advances, but in key areas of energy quality—density, net energy, intermittancy, flexibility, and so on—they remain inferior to conventional fuels. Thus, alternative energy sources are not likely to supplant fossil fuels in the short term without substantial and concerted policy intervention.

The need to restrain carbon emissions may provide the political and social pressure to accelerate the transition to wind, biomass and solar, as this is one area where they clearly trump fossil fuels. Electricity from wind and solar sources may face competition from nuclear power, the sole established low-carbon power source with significant potential for expansion. If concerns about climate change drive a transition to renewable sources, it will be the first time in human history that energetic imperatives, especially the the economic advantages of higher-quality fuels, were not the principal impetus.

FURTHER READING

* Dimitri, Carolyn, Anne Effland, and Neilson Conklin, The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy. Electronic Information Bulletin Number 3, June 2005, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

* European Wind Energy Association, Large scale integration of wind energy in the European power supply: analysis, issues and recommendations (December 2005).

* Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Summary for Policymakers, February 2007.

* Johnston, Louis D. and Samuel H. Williamson, The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the United States, 1790 - Present. Economic History Services, retrieved April 1, 2006.

* Milligan, M. and K. Porter, Determining the Capacity Value of Wind: A Survey of Methods and Implementation, Conference Paper NREL/CP-500-38062 May 2005.

* Reddy, A.K.N., Energy and social issues, in World Energy Assessment: the challenge of sustainability, UNDP/UNDESA/WEC, New York, 2000.

* Smil, V. 2006. "21st century energy: Some sobering thoughts". OECD Observer 258/59: 22-23.

* World Bank PovertyNet.


Citation

Cleveland, Cutler (Lead Author); Peter Saundry (Topic Editor). 2007. "Energy transitions past and future." In: Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment). [First published April 11, 2007; Last revised May 3, 2007; Retrieved August 7, 2007]. Source here

**Prometheus chained to Mount Caucasus. Source: Pieter Paul Rubens: ''Prometheus Bound,'' 1611-1612, Oil on canvas, 95 7/8" x 82 1/2". (Philadelphia Museum of Art: The W.P. Wilstach Collection)

Lessons Left Unlearnt From 2003 Gulf of Mexico Near-Spill

Posted by JoulesBurn on June 4, 2010 - 7:30am
Topic: Environment/Sustainability
Tags: bp, gulf of mexico, gulf of mexico oil spill, original, thunder horse, transocean [list all tags]

In May 2003, the Transocean drillship Discoverer Enterprise, under contract from BP, was getting ready to pull out of a nearly-completed development well for the Thunderhorse project in the Gulf of Mexico, about 40 miles south of the current (2010) spill at the Macondo prospect. For some reason, the ship was dragged off its position such that the riser reaching down 6000 feet to the well at the seafloor was snapped off in two places. In this case, a blind-shear ram blow out preventer (BOP) did its job, sealing off the well below and preventing what could have been the largest U.S. oil spill. As it was, the only thing spilled was the drilling mud remaining in the various riser pieces dangling from the ship, buried in mud, or stuck vertically into the seafloor. After rehabilitating the well and then taking stock of the fact that the unthinkable could have happened, BP and Transocean apparently decided not to think about it too much more.

But after reading through some MMS reports, it seems that near-misses happen a lot. Oops.

Don't Push That Button!

Drilling a well in thousands of feet of water from surface vessel is tricky business, and accidents do happen. For a good survey of the various ways in which blowouts can occur, see this rather extensive report. Also, the US Minerals Management Service (MMS), which oversees oil and gas extraction in the northern Gulf of Mexico, makes available on its web site reports of assorted accidents. A number of cases involve the riser becoming disconnected from the wellhead and spilling drilling mud into the water. It can be necessary to do this intentionally, or as part of an automated sequence, if the drillship cannot maintain its position directly above the well within some tolerance due to weather or strong currents. For example, here is one incident from 2005:

On July 5, 2005, an unplanned riser disconnect was initiated on the Ensco 7500 semi-submersible rig, which had been engaged in exploratory drilling activities, because of unfavorable sea and wind conditions associated with an approaching tropical depression. While the riser volume was being displaced with seawater in preparation for the disconnect operation, the rig was no longer able to maintain station adequately enough to complete the operation. As a result, the riser was disconnected from the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP), at which time 710 barrels of synthetic-based mud was released from the riser into the GOM. At the time of the disconnect, there were no open hole hydrocarbons exposed below the casing depth.

Here is a case where the disconnect became necessary due to bad data:

On December 2, 2007 at approximately 1300 hours with well completion operations in process, the Dynamic Positioning Operator (DPO) was performing a routine preventive maintenance procedure for the Dynamic Positioning (DP) system when the riser Emergency Disconnect Sequence (EDS) was activated. The disconnect was below the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) where it connects to the BOP stack on top of the wellhead and resulted in the discharge of approximately 550 barrels of Sodium Bromide brine into GOM waters.

For this procedure, DP functional control was transferred from the primary console to the secondary console and the primary console was subsequently shut down. DP functional control using the secondary console was observed to be normal. The primary console was restarted approximately three minutes later and the data backup function was initiated by the DPO. This function transfers control data from the online master console, at this time the secondary console, to other DP consoles to ensure correct synchronization between all consoles. The data transfer from secondary console to primary console was completed but some of the data transferred was corrupted and the DPO did not observe this. Functional control was then transferred from the secondary console to the primary console. The DPO recognized there was a discrepancy for the rig position shown on the both the primary and secondary consoles.

In an attempt to correct the error, the DPO performed a second Initialize Backup function from the now master console, the primary console. This caused corrupt data to be transferred back to secondary consolewhich now gave both the primary console and secondary console corrupt control data. The DPO, along with the Captain, observed the difference between the primary and secondary consoles and began trying to identify the fault. This was done by changing position references, transferring control capability between the control consoles, and enabling/disabling different position reference sensors. This resulted in another position reference sensor inadvertently becoming the master reference sensor and reset the apparent rig position such that the rig began to move further away from location when the DP system was trying to correct the rig position by moving the rig back on location.

This led the DP system to chase after an erroneous position causing the rig to move outside its watch circle and exceed the riser angle limit, thus leading to the initiation of the EDS by the DP system which took approximately 58 seconds to complete. The process was initiated at the Driller Control Panel after confirmation was given by the DPO. The ROV was launched to inspect the wellhead, subsea tree, and BOP stack. The rig was moved to a safe location for the DP system to be analyzed and corrected.

This sequence of events is rather comical. But better still are the cases due directly to human error (although other humans contributed with poor design). Here is one:

Investigation of Riser Disconnect and Blowout, Mississippi Canyon Block 538, OCS-G 16614 Well #2, February 28, 2000

The Ocean Concord was in the process of running a liner on drill pipe when the lower marine riser package (LMRP) was inadvertently disconnected from the blowout preventer (BOP) stack. The disconnect resulted in the discharge to the sea of approximately 806 barrels of synthetic mud from the riser and 150 barrels of synthetic mud and 150-200 barrels of crude oil from the wellbore.

Some findings:

• The SSE [Subsea Engineer] was installing the panel guards on the Riser Connector function button on the remote panel at 1410 hours on February 28, 2000.
• The remote panel cover was open and the face of the panel was pulled out at the time of the incident.
• The SSE inadvertently contacted the LMRP disconnect button while he was drilling mounting holes in the BOP panel.
• The SSE was unaware of the LMRP disconnection until he heard the alarms sounding, indicating low accumulator pressure.
• The SSE stated during the Diamond SIR meeting that he did not follow any lockout/tagout procedures to de-energize the BOP control panel prior to working on the panel.
• The light bulbs for the LMRP latch/unlatch functions were burned out at the time of the panel modifications.

The following information was provided to the panel by Diamond from their post-accident SIR meeting:

• The SSE stated that he did not realize it was possible to lock out the remote panel until after the incident.
• The SSE had never been to well-control training. He had worked for another contractor as a roughneck and had recently trained with both subsea engineers on the Concord. The SSE stated that additional training may have helped him prevent this incident. The OIM stated that this was the SSE’s second hitch on his own on the Concord.
• The SSE stated that he knew that if the riser unlatched that there would be a loss of mud from the riser, but he did not know that the well would flow. The SSE also stated that he did not consider "any such risk prior to the job" of installing the panel guards.

Here is yet another problem involving a Sea Surface Engineer pushing buttons by mistake. It can be found in the MMS reports here. The incident date was January 19, 2000.

The rig's subsea engineer was function testing the blind shear rams. The weekly function test was performed from the remote blowout preventer (BOP) panel in the offshore installation manager's office.  Instead of testing the blind shear rams, the engineer inadvertently pushed the LMRP button on the panel which unintentionally activated and disconnected the lower marine riser package (LMRP).  The control panel buttons for the lower marine riser package (LMRP) did not have enough security to prevent activating the wrong function.  It was determined that 2,400 barrels of 60% synthetic-based drilling mud (SBM) leaked into the Gulf of Mexico.  It is estimated that the lost SBM contained approximately 1,440 barrels of synthetic base oil.

Based on the block (822), this would be an early well in the Thunderhorse field. However, the first well in that block wasn't completed until 10 months later, based on the development history of the field.

Thunder Horse 2 was drilled in Block 822. It reached its total depth of 29,060ft in November 2000. The well was drilled by the Discoverer Enterprise in 6,300ft of water, 1.5 miles south-east of the discovery well. It encountered 675ft net of pay in three primary intervals.

The discovery well Thunderhorse 1 was completed in 1999 in a different block, leading to the strong probability that this well is indeed Thunderhorse 2 -- and that it took another ten months to finish. This document seems to confirm this identification (see Appendix Table H-2), indicating the drilling started in December 1999. In any case, it brings us back to the broken riser incident we started with as the drillship involved above was also the Transocean Discoverer Enterprise. BP's currently underperforming Thunderhorse endeavor seems to have had a storied beginning as well.

Failure to Disconnect

Here is a brief MMS report on the riser break incident:

The spill occurred at Mississippi Canyon (MC) 778, latitude 28.19 degrees N. and longitude 88.49 degrees W. It occurred as the Discoverer Enterprise was pulling out of the wellhole with bottom location at MC 822. At the time of the incident, conditions were 2-3 ft seas with a 1.9 knot current. The drilling vessel was in the process of pulling of of the hole when it experienced wave action heaving and jarring. The riser parted in two places at approximately 3,200 ft an 5,087 ft. water depths. There was a release of 2,450 barrels of 58% Accolade synthetic-based drilling mud (SBM). It is estimated that the lost SBM contained approximately 1,421 barrels of Accolade synthetic base oil .

I found more details, also apparently from MMS, here.

While drilling in approximately 6,000 feet of water, a drillship recently experienced a catastrophic failure of the marine riser. The drillship was equipped with a dual derrick, and dual activity was being conducted at the time of the incident. On the forward rotary, where the marine riser was installed, the rig crew was in the process of pulling out of the hole from total depth. On the aft rotary, the rig crew was in the process of running 20-inch casing for an adjacent well. The failure of the flanged marine riser occurred when drillpipe had been pulled a couple hundred feet off-bottom. At that time, the rig experienced a heave motion followed by a strong jarring action. The ROV, which had been launched to observe the running of the 20-inch casing, was dispatched to examine the marine riser.

When the ROV reached approximately 3,200 feet of water, it was determined that the riser had separated between riser joint 39 and 40 and was unloading the synthetic-based mud that was in use at the time. The drillpipe was observed to be intact at this depth. As the ROV traced the drillpipe deeper, it was found penetrating the lower section of buoyant riser that was free-standing from the seafloor to approximately 1,000 feet from the mudline. The remainder of the riser was found scattered on the seafloor surrounding the wellhead and BOP stack.

As the ROV scanned the BOP stack, it was determined that the riser was cleanly parted about one foot above the lower marine riser package. There was no flow observed from the well. When the riser parted, the "dead man" system activated, and all fail safe valves, casing shear rams, and lower blind shear rams were closed. The drillpipe was successfully sheared by this activation. At a later point, the ROV used a hot stab to activate a second set of upper blind shear rams to provide another barrier on the wellbore. Although the well control equipment functioned as designed, the parting of the marine riser resulted in a release of an undetermined amount of synthetic based mud.

The subject accident is currently under investigation by MMS. Upon its completion, the investigation report, as well as a possible follow-up Safety Alert, will be made available to the public. Your attention is directed to our conditions of approval for Applications for Permit to Drill involving the use of subsea BOP stacks. The approval outlines our requirements for the shut-in capability of the well in the event of an unplanned disconnect of the lower marine riser package or the parting of the marine riser. It should be noted again that, in this incident, the "deadman" system functioned properly and prevented the release of well bore fluids into the water column.

Shown below is a comparison of the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) for the 2003 Thunderhorse well (with the riser "parted") with that for the 2010 BP Macondo well after the bent riser was cut off with a saw. In the case of the former, the LMRP was disconnected from the BOP using the hot stab panel. For the Macondo well, this must not have been possible, since the "Containment Cap" to collect the oil was apparently designed to be sealed around the existing LMRP.

Left: LMRP for BP Thunderhorse, 2003. Right: LMRP for BP Macondo, 2010 The Afterspill, and What Could Have Been

The final MMS report on this incident was rather inconclusive as to why the riser was ripped apart.

Fate and Effects of a Spill of Synthetic-Based Drilling Fluid at Mississippi Canyon Block 778

In particular, the Loop Current in the Gulf of Mexico was exonerated:

The Loop Current did not directly affect the MC 778 drill site on May 21, 2003. Currents were weak in the upper 1,100 m (3,609 ft). Current speeds below 1,100 m (3,609 ft) are not known because measurements taken by the operator and made available to MMS did not extend from 1,100 m (3,609 ft) to the seafloor at 1,841 m (6,040 ft).

However, one report on this incident, excerpted in the TAMU spreadsheet, reads as follows:

At the time of the incident, conditions were 2-3 ft seas with a 1.9 knot current.  The drilling vessel was in the process of pulling of of the hole when it experienced wave action heaving and jarring. The riser parted in two places at approximately 3,200 ft an 5,087 ft. water depths. 

What differentiates this incident (along with many other cases of riser separation) from the 2010 Macondo spill is that the BOPs did what they are supposed to in 2003. Most importantly, the blind-shear BOP engaged, cutting through the drillstring and closing off the well.

 

Shear blades to cut through the DP and seal the well (Varco )

 

What if this hadn't happened? BP definitely thought about this, and worked with the NOAA Office of Response and Restoration to consider the potential impact.

The top connector of the BOP was damaged, with one joint leaning against the BOP, dangerously close to the control lines ....

Loss of well containment would result in more oil spilled in a week than occurred during the whole of the T/V Exxon's Valdez oil spill.

From: COMBINING MODELING WITH RESPONSE IN POTENTIAL DEEP WELL BLOWOUT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THUNDER HORSE

NOAA performed modeling to gauge the consequences of such a large spill in deepwater, but many unknown parameters prevented definitive conclusions. Indeed, the realization of the scenario with the Macondo spill has provided many surprises with regards to the fate of the oil and gas.

Heck of a Job, BP

Other paperwork which emanated from the near-spill seems less contemplative, but rather more inwardly focused on what went right in a corporate sense. First, we have an article in the Society of Professional Engineers (SPE) journal, which is available in this preview:

Thunder Horse Drilling-Riser Break—The Road to Recovery

Here are the "Major Learnings":

• Show Leadership Commitment.
• Implement Project-Management Practices Quickly.
• Secure the Right External Technical Expertise.
• Get the Right Support Staff.
• Get People in the Right Places.
• Plan How To Communicate Internally and Externally.

Also, BP funded a study by the School of Psychology at the University of Aberdeen, King’s College, Aberdeen, Scotland.

Following the initial message from the rig to the Operations Manager, an Incident Management Team (IMT) was assembled in the Houston office. The IMT immediately began to assess the situation, take steps to give instructions to the rig to assess and control damage, and to plan a longer-term response. The IMT was faced with a challenging situation, one which had never been experienced before especially in such depths of water. Fortunately neither injuries, nor environmental leakage had occurred. A number of separate sub-teams were established and tasked with dealing with issues such as Operations, Riser recovery, Blow Out Preventer (BOP) operability, Well integrity, Well re-entry, and Relief well planning. The task for the IMT was to assess and respond to any potential threat to people, wildlife or the environment, to secure the remaining riser section, to recover scattered riser pieces (on the sea bed), and eventually to re-attach the pipes connecting the rig to the well-head. After a period of 68 days, with a financial cost of $100,000 per day, the rig was re-attached to the well head and the well was stabilised without any leakages to the environment

From: INCIDENT COMMAND SKILLS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AN OIL INDUSTRY DRILLING INCIDENT

The Missing Memo

While such self-reflection is useful, recent events suggest that something is missing. The difference between a cost of $6.8 million plus 68 days delay, and a cost of untold $billions plus environmental disaster, was the last line of defense, the blowout preventer. In the 2003 spill, and in many similar cases, the fact that the blind-shear BOP functioned as intended is not a sign that the system worked, for a truly fail-safe system would be where the last line of defense from disaster is never reached. MMS did note the alarming trend in this 2005 memo:

Human Engineering Factors Result in Increasing Number of Riser Disconnects

A significant number of accidental riser disconnects have been experienced in deepwater operations during the last five years. Each event had the potential for causing serious well-control issues.

So here we are five years later, and we finally hit paydirt with a failed BOP and a spill for real. We can ponder about what would have transpired if the oversized wire cutters would have worked on the Deepwater Horizon, stopping the Macondo spill before it started. A few internal studies by those involved. Another MMS report of a drilling mud leaking from a severed riser. Louisiana fishermen still working.

Snip.

If climate change worries you most, then you cannot be happy to learn thatoil from Alberta tar sands is about to supply the biggest chunk of US oil imports. Indeed, if peak oil concerns you most, or if the future of the US economy concerns you most, you cannot be happy to hear this news either.

For you economists, oil from Alberta is not cheap. It must reflect the massive amount of engineering required to establish a tar sands mining operation, and, the energy cost of cooking oily dirt to extract oil.

For peak oil folks, that the world must turn to tar sands is just one more confirmation that the cheap conventional crude is now in decline. So what to do? First, let’s take a look at North America oil supply over the past 20 years. This is the oil produced by Canada, the US and Mexico (click to enlarge):

Here in United States we like to outsource the extraction of our oil supply to anyone but ourselves. We don’t particularly want to see the results of our own demand for liquid fuels, the pull from our 300 million vehicles and our four million miles of highways. We’d prefer that someone else–preferably far away–despoil their own landscape. And we’ve done quite a good job over the past several decades to make sure that’s happened, as the amount of oil we’ve had to import from the Mideast, from Africa, from Mexico and Canada has skyrocketed. This background is helpful in framing the BP well blowout in 5000 feet of Gulf deepwater. The reality of our oil demand has now touched home. In fact, it’s washing up on our coastline.

In the previous world of Ricardian Comparative Advantage, the decline of North American oil supply didn’t matter so much. But now that oil is no longer a cheap widget that can be efficiently sourced globally, regional and domestic supplies have started to matter. Whether or not you agree with solutions like the Pickens Plan (opens to video page at the recent Milken conference), you at least have to give Mr Pickens credit for identifying the problem: a very nasty mechanism, if you will, of increased capital outflows for increasingly expensive global oil is now at work like a buzz saw on the US economy. And it’s only going to get worse from here.

If the solution to a problem is unsufficiently scaled to the size of the problem, then at best we can say it’s a token solution. And token solutions are what the US has been trying out for 40 years, on the matter of energy. 8 billion for High Speed Rail? Sorry, but the restoration of rail in this country is an 800 billion dollar project and that would be just for the first wave. Adoption of electric vehicles, as part of some cultural need to maintain US car culture? Sure, at realistic adoption rates you might be running mostly on EVs in 150-200 years. Switch the powergrid to 100% renewable resources like Wind and Solar in ten years? Not likely. But maybe if you are willing to withdraw the entirety of US armed services from overseas, devote the entire military budget for 10 years, and match that workforce with highly skilled workers from the private sector, then maybe you can make a dent by 2020.

When a politician tells you they want to solve for climate change while investing heavily in automobiles and highways, rest assured that is decidedly unserious. When former politicians claim you can have an all renewable powergrid in ten years, that is not helping anyone. When academics tell you that we can be operating in an all renewable world by 2030, but have nothing in their model to account for the energy needed to build that new world, that is simply not good enough. Nota bene: nearly all energy transition plans and especially plans to transition to alternative energy depend on economic growth. All those models assume there will be a sufficient inventory of growth that can be redirected to a different energy architecture. As you contemplate this, also realize that to construct a lower carbon-emitting future poses a question: what is the energy source that will be used, to conduct energy transition?

Perhaps a glance back up at the chart of North American oil supply will help clarify the problem. The United States occupies an enormous swath of the continent, and has added most of its current built environment during the fossil fuel era. The country was built on coal and oil.

Indeed, it’s still running on coal and oil. And the intractability of this infrastructure is why energy transition is so hard. It is unserious therefore to say that it will be easy or quick to start running it on different energy sources. And I would suggest that anyone who makes that claim, or naively supports those who do, should be disqualified from the conversation.

If you want political traction on climate change or peak oil issues–which are both problems of energy transition—then only an accurate confrontation with scale and time will suffice to make contact with the problem.

About the author: Gregor MacdonaldGregor Macdonald is an oil analyst and energy sector investor, who also focuses on the coming transition to alternatives. He has spent this decade researching and investing in the energy sector. While his focus remains on global fossil fuel supply, he has developed several models for transition... More

THE explosion that claimed 11 lives and sent the Deepwater Horizon, a billion-dollar oil rig, to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, was bad enough. But for the inhabitants of America’s Gulf coast, for BP, the huge British firm that owns the well, and for the oil industry as a whole, the bad news is flowing as relentlessly as the oil gushing from ruptured pipes a mile below the waves (see article). Efforts to close an emergency shut-off valve have failed. BP is trying to drop huge domes over the leaks and siphon off the oil they collect. But if that fails, it could be months before a second well is completed, reducing the pressure in the first and thus stemming the flow.

Some two weeks after the initial accident, oil has begun to wash up on the frail marshes and rich oyster beds that line Louisiana’s shores. Pictures of basted seabirds and gasping turtles have engulfed the media. Commercial fishing has been suspended in the vicinity of the spill. There is talk that the slick could wash up on Florida’s west coast, smothering the lucrative local tourism industry, or even leach into the Atlantic and up America’s eastern seaboard, abetted by the Gulf Stream.

Investors, foreseeing vast bills for cleaning and compensation, have wiped some $30 billion off BP’s value. Other firms involved, including Anadarko, one of BP’s partners in the ill-fated well, Transocean, which was in charge of the drilling, Halliburton, which fitted the cement cap that was supposed to have sealed the well, and Cameron, which made the failed backup system, have also been walloped. Congress has summoned executives from these firms for pillorying. Moves are afoot to lift the cap on oil firms’ liability for the economic damage done by oil spills from $75m to $10 billion (they are already on the hook for unlimited clean-up costs).

Related items

• The Gulf of Mexico oil spill: Black storm risingMay 6th 2010
• Lexington: The politics of disasterMay 6th 2010
• Schumpeter: In the black stuffMay 6th 2010

The oil industry’s hope that more American waters would be opened to drilling is receding as fast as the slick advances. Barack Obama, who had briefly supported the idea, has put all drilling on hold while the causes of the disaster are investigated. The governors of Florida and California have retracted their support too. “Why”, asks California’s Arnold Schwarzenegger, “would we want to take on that kind of risk?”

Slick salesmen

Because that is where the oil is, oilmen retort. The Gulf of Mexico accounts for almost a third of America’s oil production and the lion’s share of new discoveries. Most dry land has been picked over, and better technology allows exploration in ever deeper waters. Elsewhere too, Western oil firms are being forced offshore as nationalist governments curtail their involvement in big, easily tapped fields on land. The Gulf of Mexico and the waters off Africa and Brazil are among the most enticing prospects to which they still have access. If Americans do not want to hand even more money and clout to the likes of Iran, Russia and Venezuela, the argument runs, they should not curb offshore drilling. Even if they do, rising oil powers such as Angola and Brazil are not going to follow suit.

Moreover, in America at least, oil firms have been reasonable stewards of the seas. Before Deepwater Horizon foundered there had not been a big leak from an offshore oil well for 40 years. Average annual spills from underwater pipelines declined from 2.5m gallons in 1980-84 to just 12,000 gallons in 2000-04, according to the Congressional Research Service. America’s National Research Council reckons that offshore drilling accounts for 1% of the oil floating in the country’s waters, and tankers and pipelines only a further 4%, compared with 33% from other shipping and 62% from natural seepage (though the industry’s spills are more concentrated, and so more harmful). As the fleet of 200 ships battling the slick shows, oil firms have elaborate plans to mop up leaks.

In this instance the oil spilled is quite volatile, so much of it should disperse or evaporate before reaching the coast, where it will do the most damage. The warmth of the air and water in the Gulf should also help. Since the well is 40 miles offshore and the weather has been relatively clement, there has been time to test dispersal techniques and prepare coastal defences.

Rigged result

For all these reasons, the long-term repercussions of the spill may not be so grave. BP, its subcontractors, federal and state governments, environmental activists, injured businesses and their insurers will all spend decades suing one another. The Supreme Court, after all, took almost 20 years to settle the punitive damages arising from theExxon Valdez spill off Alaska in 1989. But Exxon’s share price quickly recovered from that accident (followed, more slowly, by the local environment); it went on to become the world’s biggest listed firm. BP, which made profits of $5.6 billion in the first quarter of this year, will not be crippled by the spill (see Schumpeter), even if its costs run into billions.

Congress will stiffen oversight of offshore drilling and boost the penalties for lapses. Fewer states will open their waters to oilmen—although the governor of Virginia, for one, says he is still willing. But there will not, sadly, be any more comprehensive effort to account for the noxious side-effects of oil.

For spills are hardly the most baleful consequence of America’s oil addiction: global warming and the funding of foreign despots surely come higher up the list. Perversely, this spill is likely to set back efforts to get a bill on climate change through Congress, and to increase the flow of dollars to despots (see Lexington). However you measure the full cost of a gallon of gas, pollution and all, Americans are nowhere close to paying it. Indeed, their whole energy industry—from subsidies for corn ethanol to limited liability for nuclear power—is a slick of preferences and restrictions, without peer. The tinkering that will follow this spill will merely further complicate it.

Offshore drilling seems like a sensible way to obtain a very handy product. Extra safeguards may be needed. But if the politicians are really as committed to “cleaning up” the energy industry as they now claim, far more could be achieved by reducing the subsidies and introducing a carbon tax. That may seem a long way from the calamity in the Gulf; but in the long run those other murky waters also need to be cleaned up.

The Economist Newspaper | Leaders

The Crisis Comes Ashore
by Al Gore

The continuing undersea gusher of oil 50 miles off the shores of Louisiana is not the only source of dangerous uncontrolled pollution spewing into the environment. Worldwide, the amount of man-made CO2 being spilled every three seconds into the thin shell of atmosphere surrounding the planet equals the highest current estimate of the amount of oil spilling from the Macondo well every day. Indeed, the average American coal-fired power generating plant gushes more than three times as much global-warming pollution into the atmosphere each day—and there are over 1,400 of them.

Just as the oil companies told us that deep-water drilling was safe, they tell us that it’s perfectly all right to dump 90 million tons of CO2 into the air of the world every 24 hours. Even as the oil spill continues to grow—even as BP warns that the flow could increase multi-fold, to 60,000 barrels per day, and that it may continue for months—the head of the American Petroleum Institute, Jack Gerard, says, "Nothing has changed. When we get back to the politics of energy, oil and natural gas are essential to the economy and our way of life." His reaction reminds me of the day Elvis Presley died. Upon hearing the tragic news, Presley’s manager, Colonel Tom Parker, said, “This changes nothing.”

However, both the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the CO2 spill into the global atmosphere are causing profound and harmful changes—directly and indirectly. The oil is having a direct impact on fish, shellfish, turtles, seabirds, coral reefs, marshes, and the entire web of life in the Gulf Coast. The indirect effects include the loss of jobs in the fishing and tourism industries; the destruction of the health, vitality, and rich culture of communities in the region; imminent bankruptcies; vast environmental damage expected to persist for decades; and the disruption of seafood markets nationwide.

And, of course, the consequences of our ravenous consumption of oil are even larger. Starting 40 years ago, when America's domestic oil production peaked, our dependence on foreign oil has steadily grown. We are now draining our economy of several hundred billion dollars a year in order to purchase foreign oil in a global market dominated by the huge reserves owned by sovereign states in the Persian Gulf. This enormous and increasing transfer of wealth contributes heavily to our trade and current-account deficits, and enriches regimes in the most unstable region of the world, helping to finance both terrorism and Iran’s relentless effort to build a nuclear arsenal.

The profound risk to our national and economic security posed by the prospect of the world’s sudden loss of access to Persian Gulf oil contributed greatly to the strategic miscalculations and public deceptions that led to our costly invasion of Iraq, including the reckless diversion of military and intelligence assets from Afghanistan before our mission there was accomplished. I am far from the only one who believes that it is not too much of a stretch to link the ongoing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and northwestern Pakistan—and even last week’s attempted bombing in Times Square—to a long chain of events triggered in part by our decision to allow ourselves to become so dependent on foreign oil.

Here at home, the illusion that we can meaningfully reduce our dependence on foreign oil by taking extraordinary risks to develop deep reserves in the Outer Continental Shelf is illuminated by the illustration below. The addition to oil company profits may be significant, but the benefits to our national security are trivial. Meanwhile, our increasing appetite for coal is also creating environmental and human catastrophes. The obscene practice known as “mountaintop mining,” for instance, is not only defacing the landscape of Appalachia but also destroying streams throughout the region and poisoning the drinking water of many communities.

The huge oil slick originating on the deep sea-bed beneath the Gulf of Mexico is here seen from space by a NASA satellite in mid-May 2010, turning to enter the turbulent  "loop current" that would bring it up the coast of Florida and beyond. Three quarters of the US seafood industry and numerous special sites of scientific interest are already threatened with devastation, in what fossil fuel corporations have hitherto defined as "externality" of "energy production". More objective experts have called it an "accident waiting to happen" at the expense of wildlife, fisheries, taxpayers and one of the world's great ecosystems.- Ed.

The direct consequences of burning these vast and ever-growing amounts of oil and coal are a buildup of heat in the atmosphere worldwide and the increased acidity of the oceans. (Although the world has yet to focus on ocean acidification, the problem is terrifying. Thirty million of the 90 million tons of CO2 being spilled each day end up in the oceans as carbonic acid, changing the pH level by more than at any time in the last many millions of years, thus inflicting every form of life in the ocean that makes a shell or a reef with a kind of osteoporosis—interfering with their ability to transform calcium carbonate into the hard structures upon which their life depends—that threatens the survival of many species of zooplankton at the base of the ocean food chain.)

But rising global temperatures and increasing acidification in the ocean are only the beginning. These processes have triggered a cascading set of other impacts, which include:

* The melting of virtually all of the mountain glaciers in the world—already well underway—threatening the supplies of fresh water for drinking and agriculture in many parts of the world. 
  
* The prospective disappearance of the North Polar Ice Cap, which for most of the last three million years has covered an area roughly the size of the continental United States. Approximately 25 percent–30 percent of this ice cap (measured by the area that it used to cover) has disappeared in the last 30 years during summer. The thickness of the remaining ice has also sharply diminished. 
  
* The melting of the two largest masses of ice on the planet—on top of Greenland and Antarctica (especially West Antarctica, where the bottom of the ice rests under the sea atop submerged islands) is already accelerating far beyond earlier estimates—threatening catastrophic increases in sea level worldwide. 
  
* As the seas rise more rapidly, many millions of climate refugees will be forced to flee from areas they have long called home. Indeed, thousands have already been forced to move from low-lying island nations. The government of the Maldives has included a new line item in this year’s budget for a fund to buy a new country. That option will not be available to Bangladesh. 
  
* Deeper and longer droughts in mid-continent regions, as soil moisture evaporates more rapidly with higher temperatures. 
  
* More and larger forest fires as drier vegetation becomes kindling for lightning—which, according to researchers at the University of Tel Aviv, is also predicted to increase at the rate of 10 percent with each additional degree of temperature. 
  
* The migration of tropical diseases to temperate latitudes, as new ecological niches invite the intrusion of viruses and bacteria and the mosquitoes, ticks, and other “vectors” that carry these diseases. This process is also already underway. 
  
* An accelerated extinction rate which, according to E. O. Wilson and other biologists, threatens to reach levels not seen since the dinosaurs were wiped out 65 million years ago. 
  
* The increased destructive power of tropical storms coming off the ocean (hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons—all different names for the same phenomenon). Though the number of these storms is not predicted to increase, their destructive power is—due to increases in wind speeds and moisture content. 
  
* Increased large downpours of both rain and snow—with a steady shift from snow to rain—resulting in an increased frequency of large floods on every continent. 

This last phenomenon—long understood by scientists to be one of the most confidently predictable consequences of global warming—hit home for many of my neighbors last week when Nashville, the city where I live, suffered what the Army Corps of Engineers described as “a 1,000 year rain event” that caused horrendous flooding, mostly in neighborhoods that had no flood insurance—because homeowners there had been assured that they lived well outside the historic flood plain. The tragic loss of many lives was accompanied by the ruination of thousands of homes and property damages that Mayor Karl Dean estimated at one and a half billion dollars.
 

Scientists are always careful in the way they describe the cause-and-effect relationship between global warming and such events: It is a mistake, they say, to attribute any single extreme weather event only to global warming, because there is large natural variability in weather—but the odds of extremely large downpours, scientists repeatedly insist, are steadily increasing with global warming, and such events are predicted to become far more common with each passing decade because when water evaporates from the warmer oceans, warmer air holds more of it. Average humidity worldwide has already increased by 4 percent since 1970, and each additional degree Fahrenheit increases it by another 3 percent-4 percent. The range of increases in global average temperature during this century is estimated at between 2? Fahrenheit to 11.5? Fahrenheit. The high end of this range would be utterly catastrophic, threatening the survival of civilization as we know it.

Even now, the hydrological cycle of the entire globe is being radically altered. The timing and predictability of rainfall is changing in ways that are already beginning to disrupt agriculture—particularly subsistence agriculture in developing countries. Crop failures and food insecurity are increasing ominously in many regions where farmers are no longer able to rely on the clockwork intervals of rainy seasons and dry seasons they learned from previous generations. The record snowfalls last winter in the northeastern United States also fit into the same pattern. Indeed, the Northeast has long been included among the regions of the world predicted to experience the most dramatic increases in precipitation. Bizarre changes in precipitation patterns are now being observed in many regions throughout the world. Last month, British scientists working near the North Pole were astonished by an unprecedented April rainfall. David Phillips, a senior climatologist in Canada, described the event as “bizarre,” adding, “This is up there among fish falling from the sky or Niagara Falls running dry.”

Temperatures inside the Arctic Circle are increasing far more rapidly than in the rest of the world because the progressive melting of ice and snow leads to a radical change in the amount of heat absorbed by the surface of the uncovered tundra and Arctic Ocean. Incoming solar radiation is no longer reflected by the ice and snow. Arctic researchers from the University of Washington have documented the beginning of significant releases of methane caused by the rapid thawing of permafrost in Alaska and Siberia.

One important difference between the oil spill and the CO2 spill is that petroleum is visible on the surface of the sea and carries a distinctive odor now filling the nostrils of people on shore. Carbon dioxide, on the other hand, is invisible, odorless, tasteless, and has no price tag. It is all too easily put “out of sight and out of mind.” Because the impacts of global warming are distributed globally, they often masquerade as an abstraction. And because the length of time between causes and consequences is longer than we are used to dealing with, we are vulnerable to the illusion that we have the luxury of time before we begin to respond.

But neither assumption is correct. Most of the heat trapped by greenhouse gases is stored in the oceans and reemerges over time into the atmosphere. As a result, we are capable-–through inaction—of making truly disastrous consequences inevitable long before the worst impacts are manifested. Our perception of the dangers of the climate crisis therefore relies on our ability to understand and trust the conclusions reached by the most elaborate and impressive scientific assessment in the history of our civilization. In other words, rather than relying on visceral responses, we have to draw upon our capacity for reasoning, communicating clearly with one another, forming a global consensus on the basis of science, and making a choice in favor of preventive action on a global scale.

During the last 22 years, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has produced four massive studies warning the world of the looming catastrophe that is being caused by the massive dumping of global-warming pollution into the atmosphere. Unfortunately, this process has been vulnerable to disruption and paralysis by a cynical and lavishly funded disinformation campaign. A number of large carbon polluters, whose business plans rely on their continued ability to freely dump their gaseous waste products into the global atmospheric commons—as if it is an open sewer—have chosen to pursue a determined and highly organized campaign aimed at undermining public confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the global scientific community. They have attacked the scientific community by financing pseudo-studies aimed at creating public doubt about peer-reviewed science. They have also manipulated the political and regulatory process with outsized campaign contributions and legions of lobbyists (there are now four anti-climate lobbyists for every single member of the House and Senate).

This epic public contest between the broad public interest and a small but powerful special interest has taken place during a time when American democracy has grown sclerotic. The role of money in our politics has exploded to a dangerous level. Our democratic conversation is now dominated by expensive 30-second television commercials, which consume two-thirds of the campaign budgets of candidates in both political parties. The only reliable source of such large sums of campaign cash is business lobbies. Most members of the House and Senate facing competitive election contests are forced to spend several hours each day asking special interests for money to finance their campaigns. Instead of participating in committee hearings, floor debates, and Burkean reflection on the impact of the questions being considered, they spend their time as supplicants. Though many struggle to resist the influence their donors intend to have on their decision-making process, all too frequently human nature takes its course.
 

Their constituents now spend an average of five hours per day watching television—which is, of course, why campaigns in both political parties spend most of their money on TV advertising. Viewers also absorb political messages from the same special interests that are wining and dining and contributing to their elected officials. The largest carbon polluters have, for the last 17 years, sought to manipulate public opinion with a massive and continuing propaganda campaign, using TV advertisements and all other forms of mass persuasion. It is a game plan spelled out in one of their internal documents, which was leaked to an enterprising reporter, that stated: “reposition global warming as theory rather than fact.” In other words, they have mimicked the strategy pioneered by the tobacco industry, which undermined the scientific consensus linking the smoking of cigarettes with diseases of the lung and heart—successfully delaying appropriate health measures for almost 40 years after the landmark surgeon general’s report of 1964.

Meanwhile, many other countries—including China—have developed national strategies for leading the historic shift from oil and coal to renewable forms of energy, higher levels of efficiency, smart grids and fast trains, sustainable agriculture and forestry.

Here in the United States, the House of Representatives has passed a meaningful plan to move America in the same direction and reestablish our capacity to provide leadership in the world community on the most important issue facing the world today. The Senate, however, has struggled for the last 17 months to find enough votes to take up its own version of the same legislative plan. The unpleasant reality now spilling onto the shores of the Gulf Coast is creating public outrage and may also be generating a new opportunity to pass legislation, just as the oil spill 20 years ago from the Exxon Valdez created public momentum sufficient to overcome the anti-environment special interests. There is new hope that by the time the gusher from the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico is capped, so will carbon emissions from the burning of oil and coal.
 

It is understandable that the administration will be focused on the immediate crisis in the Gulf of Mexico. But this is a consciousness-shifting event. It is one of those clarifying moments that brings a rare opportunity to take the longer view. Unless we change our present course soon, the future of human civilization will be in dire jeopardy. Just as we feel a sense of urgency in demanding that this ongoing oil spill be stopped, we should feel an even greater sense of urgency in demanding that the much larger and more dangerous ongoing emissions of global warming pollution must also be stopped to make the world safe from the climate crisis that is building all around us.